President Obama declared in a 2011 address to the Australian Parliament, “With most of

the world’s nuclear power and some half of humanity, Asia will largely define whether the

century ahead will be marked by conflict or cooperation, needless suffering or human pro-

gress.”

ten largest economies, sitting at the intersection of global trade and commerce, events in

the Asia-Pacific are unlikely to impact only the countries in the region. When combined

with increasing military expenditures by regional powers, multiple nuclear-armed states,

While the administration of George W. Bush increased U.S. attention toward the region

notable shift in U.S. strategy began under the stewardship of President Barack Obama and

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Writing in Foreign Policy in 2011, Secretary Clinton

See former Assistant Secretary Kurt Campbell’s 2015 testimony in front of the Senate Armed Services Com-

Dan Blumenthal notes that this trend began during the George H. W. Bush administration and cites the

2

noted that the United States needed to be “smart and systematic” about where to invest

U.S. time and resources. She argued that “One of the most important tasks of American

statecraft over the next decade will therefore be to lock in a substantially increased invest-

ment — diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise — in the Asia-Pacific region.”

potential to develop into a key strategic ally.

Central to this refocus of U.S. attention was a commitment to remain engaged in the re-

gion. As President Obama put it in his 2011 speech:

“As President, I have, therefore, made a deliberate and strategic decision -- as a Pa-

cific nation, the United States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping this re-

gion and its future, by upholding core principles and in close partnership with our

allies and friends.”

significant diplomatic effort to reassure U.S. allies such as Japan and the Philippines, both

embroiled in territorial disputes with China, about U.S. commitment to their security. U.S.

planners began to speculate about new basing opportunities throughout the region, even

as the U.S. military was withdrawing forces from Europe and the Middle East.

The Obama administration’s approach to the region, however, did have gaps. The United

States struggled to develop an economic pillar to complement its diplomatic and military

initiatives in the region. The economic strategy for the “rebalance” was primarily built

around the Obama administration’s hopes for the Trans-Pacific partnership, holding up

the eventual agreement as a panacea for countries in the region concerned about their in-

marily a military strategy rather than one utilizing all aspects of U.S. national power. The

Strategic Opportunity with India,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2007 https://www.foreignaf-

fairs.com/articles/asia/2007-11-01/americas-strategic-opportunity-india

https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-austral-

ian-parliament

3

Obama administration, which had hoped to capitalize on a receding tide of war, to para-

phrase the President, and “pivot” to Asia, away from Europe and the Middle East, found

itself pulled back into both theaters in 2013, with Russia’s annexation of Crimea and sub-

sequent invasion of eastern Ukraine. In his haste to withdraw from the Middle East, Presi-

island building that generated significant international attention, but little concrete action

in response. Chinese repression increased at home and in places like Hong Kong and Tai-

wan to little international pushback. Meanwhile, China’s ongoing efforts to deepen its eco-

nomic engagement in the region, including with U.S. partners, was met only with ongoing

TPP negotiations that struggled to find an end until several months into President

Obama’s final year in office, only to have its erstwhile champion, Secretary Clinton, dis-

tance herself from the agreement in her own campaign for the White House.

By the end of his tenure in office, as they dealt with an administration team increasingly

focused on the Middle East and Russia, Asian allies often complained about American ne-

glect and questioned U.S. commitment to a region that once again, had fallen off of the

This was the situation that faced the Trump administration upon taking office in January

2017. Candidate Trump ran for President advocating a confrontational approach toward

China yet also stressed his deal-making ability with the Chinese.

tion had carefully couched its “rebalance” to Asia in non-confrontational terms, warning of

the consequences of a rising China that disrupted the rules-based international order, but

still holding out hope for cooperation with Beijing. Secretary Clinton spoke of building

“mutual trust” and encouraging “China’s active efforts in global problem-solving.”

successor, Secretary of State John Kerry, devoted significant time to engaging the Chinese

in global institutions tended to end up changing those institutions rather than changing

See Robert Zoellick, “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?” Remarks to National Committee

4

China. Instead of liberalizing its political system as it liberalized its economy, Chinese

state managed capitalism appeared to thrive in part through a closing political space and

similar models were increasingly being promoted by China in its neighborhood. Commen-

tary regarding a Chinese alternative model to the inefficient and at times struggling Indian

ing of jobs and production to China and other countries played a key role in Senator Ber-

nie Sanders’s arguments about trade and Secretary Clinton’s reversal on TPP.

On his first full weekday in office, President Trump announced his withdrawal from the

TPP, fulfilling a campaign promise and undermining his ability to outline an overarching

economic vision for the region to compete with Chinese initiatives, such as the China-led

Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership or the Belt and Road Initiative. An early

summit with President Xi Jinping at Mar-a-Lago several months later raised concerns in

some Asian capitals about the President’s seriousness towards Beijing. Combined with a

seeming administration inattention to ongoing Chinese strategic gains in the South China

Sea, which the Obama administration had publicly discussed but done little to counter,

Pacific” repeatedly, Tillerson embraced a concept that had been used for some time by U.S.

allies in the region. Highlighting a vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific “protected by two

strong pillars of democracy: The United States and India,” Tillerson’s speech was not a sig-

nificant departure from the Obama administration’s approach, although Tillerson’s char-

acterization of China’s actions was more stark than the previous team’s focus on engage-

ment:

“China, while rising alongside India, has done so less responsibly, at times undermin-

ing the international rules-based order, even as countries like India operate within a

Open Indo-Pacific became the Trump administration’s “rebalance,” a framing concept that

https://www.cnn.com/2015/08/24/politics/scott-walker-china-xi-jinping-2016/index.html

Secretary Rex Tillerson, “Defining Our Relationship with India for the Next Century,” October 18, 2017, CSIS

https://www.csis.org/analysis/defining-our-relationship-india-next-century-address-us-secretary-state-rex-

tillerson

5

all elements of the U.S. government could rally and organize behind and likeminded part-

ners in the region could embrace and echo, with their own variations. The National Secu-

rity Strategy released by the White House in December 2017 adopted the framing, “A geo-

political competition between free and repressive visions of world order.”

the Indo-Pacific strategy that Tillerson had announced previously, outlining a vision for

the region where the global commons are accessible to all, disputes are resolved peace-

fully, and an economically “open” region that includes “fair and reciprocal trade, open in-

vestment environments, transparent agreement between nations, and improved connec-

tivity.”

Like the Tillerson speech, Pompeo’s announcements were positively received by regional

partners hungry for U.S. leadership. Yet, beyond the announced investment incentive pro-

grams, which were dwarfed by the more than $1 trillion of investments China has an-

nounced as part of its Belt and Road Initiative, the administration’s attempt to outline an

economic pillar to the Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept was underwhelming.

the region, many of the same challenges to the concept that bedeviled the Obama admin-

istration persist to this day and some have been deepened during the tenure of President

Trump.

First and foremost is the alienation of allies and likeminded partners. Any strategy to

shape the contours of the rise of China will be dependent on partners. China lacks natural

allies and the extensive web of partnerships between democracies in the Indo-Pacific as

well as smaller non-democracies in China’s shadow interested in closer ties with the U.S.

has moved closer to China, seeking additional Chinese investment and undermining mo-

mentum to pressure China regarding its actions in the South China Sea in the wake of the

https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf

https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf

Secretary Mike Pompeo, “America’s Indo-Pacific Economic Vision,” U.S. Chamber of Commerce, July 30,

6

Alliance relationships have also suffered from the rotating cast of Trump administration

officials in key national security positions. Even those, like Secretary of State Pompeo,

whose position presently appears somewhat secure, have faced similar challenges to their

predecessors late in the Obama administration, who had to spend their time putting out

to the President’s own questions about the efficacy of some longstanding U.S. partnerships

and multilateral arrangements. The administration has attempted to reinvigorate the

Quad, with occasional working level meetings of officials from the United States, Japan,

Australia, and India, yet concerns about Beijing’s response to the initiative and a lack of

trust between some of the partners have limited its usefulness.

statesmanship has significantly undermined efforts to get all U.S. partners in the region

moving in the same direction. An early leap forward in U.S.-India relations has been fol-

lowed by a return of Indian debates about the wisdom of getting too close to Washington,

in part because of U.S. policy toward Russia and Iran, but also reportedly because of suspi-

cion about President Trump’s own motives.

cause of uncertainty about the trajectory of U.S.-China relations given the President’s

mixed messages, allies in the region have been forced to balance their own strategic com-

petition, with continued engagement of Beijing.

As during portions of the Obama administration, U.S. strategy in the region lacks a central

figure capable of helping to maintain close relationships with partners. Despite appoint-

ing special envoys at the State Department to handle several international challenges, the

Trump administration has yet to appoint a high-level diplomat to cover the entire Indo-

Pacific region. The portfolio remains bifurcated across multiple State Department bu-

reaus, and thus overseen by multiple Assistant Secretary positions that remain unfilled al-

For a convincing argument about the progress being made despite the Quad’s limitations, see Dhruva

with Japan’s prime minister,” The Washington Post, August 28, 2018 https://www.washing-

tonpost.com/world/national-security/i-remember-pearl-harbor-inside-trumps-hot-and-cold-relationship-

with-japans-prime-minister/2018/08/28/d6117021-e310-40a4-b688-

68fdf5ed2f38_story.html?utm_term=.b1e2d4efc313

7

A second major challenge is the administration’s lack of a coherent regional trade and eco-

nomic agenda. Despite some brief wavering under pressure from Republican Senators,

Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy, instead delivered a diatribe about trade, expressing

his willingness to negotiate bilateral trade agreements and saying, “What we will no

longer do is enter into large agreements that tie our hands, surrender our sovereignty, and

make meaningful enforcement practically impossible.”

Yet, almost halfway into his first term in office, the administration is running out of time

for significant new agreements to be negotiated and approved by Congress before the

2020 elections and the TPP-11 have moved ahead without the United States. In October

2018, U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer notified Congress of the administra-

tion’s intent to negotiate trade agreements with several partners, including Japan. Yet a

potential U.S.-Japan agreement would not have the regional strategic impact that TPP

the announcements from the Indo-Pacific Business Forum have been followed up with ef-

forts to reform and consolidate U.S. programs providing development finance, greater co-

ordination between donor countries in the region will need to occur. While the Trump ad-

ministration has begun to address early Obama-era concerns about Defense Department

resources devoted to the region, given the pressure on the State Department and U.S. for-

eign assistance budgets, U.S. funding devoted to the Indo-Pacific has not matched the sup-

posed prioritization of the region in U.S. policy.

ingness to enforce red lines such as those related to chemical weapons use has sent a

stronger message about the U.S. commitment to maintain its international commitments,

For some ideas to correct this ongoing challenge, see Eric Sayers, “15 Big Ideas to Operationalize America’s

8

These doubts extend to America’s schizophrenic relationship with Beijing. For years, U.S.

strategists developed a counter China strategy yet were unwilling to call it such. Now,

China is no longer a challenge looming on the horizon, and the U.S. gloves are coming off,

Yet America is increasingly viewed as divided and distracted. Addressing this crisis in

confidence of American leadership will be key if the Free and Open Indo-Pacific is to be-

come anything more than a slogan given that unlike the Cold War, there is no formal secu-

rity architecture that links regional partners beyond the hub and spokes model of bilateral

U.S. security ties. If this does not happen, U.S. allies and partners are likely to continue to

hedge as they see an administration that speaks harshly regarding Chinese actions out of

one side of their mouth as Vice President Pence did earlier this month, while President

Trump lauds the fact that “President Xi and I will always be friends.”

whether the Indo-Pacific remains free and open.

As the Trump administration has been outlining its approach to the Indo-Pacific and to-

wards China, U.S. allies in Europe increasingly view Beijing with similar skepticism to

their American counterparts. Europe simply has too much at stake in the region between

India and China to be a mere bystander. As the Trump administration has spurned re-

gional economic engagement, the European Union has been negotiating a series of trade

agreements with key regional partners. The EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement

signed in July 2018 was the biggest ever negotiated by the EU and will cover a third of the

world’s economy. Several European states, most notably France, are active players in

reaching European territory, have been ahead of the curve. The EU recently released a

https://www.axios.com/trump-xi-jinping-china-friends-trade-tweet-1ed4706b-dd7e-4e14-9c48-

65b867bf58db.html

See Jonas Parello-Plesner, “The French Navy Stands up to China,” Wall Street Journal, June 7, 2018

https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-french-navy-stands-up-to-china-1528411691

9

connectivity strategy that outlines a sustainable, comprehensive, and rules-based ap-

proach to Euro-Asian connectivity.

An EU India strategy is nearing completion.

Yet to be full participants in the emerging Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept, European

ments with key partners like India, Japan, Australia, and others.

If the Trump administration is serious about developing a coherent strategy for the Indo-

Pacific, allies, including the Europeans, will need to be prioritized. Trilaterals between the

United States and key regional partners such as Australia and Japan with key European

partners, like France, should be expanded. The administration should consider Japanese

proposals to build on the Quad by occasionally including British and French security offi-

cials. EU proposals on connectivity should be incorporated into ongoing discussions with

Japan, Australia and India about their national capacities in this area as well as discussions

with Taiwan about its New Southbound Policy. On trade, continued Section 232 and 301

tariffs against the Europeans run the risk of doing nothing more than alienating the very

The Trump administration has rightly assessed that the China challenge will likely define

U.S. national security for the coming decades. Europeans are America’s closest allies, eco-

nomic partners, and largest bloc of advanced democracies. It would be foolish to ignore

the convergence of interests and to instead feud and fight across the Atlantic. Such an ap-

proach would only serve Beijing's interests and put any U.S. strategy to support a Free and

Open Indo-Pacific at risk of early failure.

Until the United States sends a consistent message to U.S. allies and prospective partners

cific prosperity and stability will suffer. Ultimate success in avoiding costly conflict will

come only if the United States leverages its natural strengths – deeper partnerships with

See https://cdn3-eeas.fpfis.tech.ec.europa.eu/cdn/farfu-